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NOTES
ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECT OF THE JURISDICTION CLAUSE
IN ADMIRALTY
In 1930, in commenting upon provisions in a bill of lading which
purported to confine all litigation. to a French court, Judge Learned
Hand said: "The respondent does not pretend that, so construed,
these would be valid, and it is of course well settled that they would
not." 1
In 1949, the same judge, in a case involving a similar provision,
wrote in a concurring opinion: "In truth, I do not believe that, today
at least, there is an absolute taboo against such contracts at all....
What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more than a general
hostility, which can be overcome, but which nevertheless does
persist." 2
The two statements dramatically portray the development of
legal thought in the area of jurisdiction clauses-thought which cul-
minated in the enforcement of such a clause in Win. H. Muller & Co.
v. Swedish American Line Ltd.3 An agreement which resulted in
ousting a court of competent jurisdiction and of limiting a plaintiff
to a specific court in which to seek his remedy had been traditionally
held invalid as against public policy,4 at least where the agreement
was made prior to the accrual of the cause of action.5 Such clauses,
in addition to being found in bills of lading, are commonly found in
railroad employment contracts,6 in insurance contracts, 7 and in a
variety of other types of agreements,8 and have almost invariably
:'Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d
941, 942 (2d Cir. 1930).
2 Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (con-
curring opinion).
3224 F2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
4 E.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82
Fed. 508 (6th Cir. 1897); Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co.,
223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916).
'5Where the agreement is made subsequent to the accrual of the cause of
action, the greater number of courts view the agreement enforceable. Gitler
v. Russian Co., 124 App. Div. 273, 108 N.Y. Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1908);
Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1936).6 E.g., Krenger v. Pennsylvania RR., supra note 2.
7 E.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, supra
note 4; Slocum v. Western Assur. Co., 42 Fed. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).8 E.g., Otero v. Banco De Sonora, 26 Ariz. 356, 225 Pac. 1112 (1924) (sale
been held unenforceable.9 As is indicated by the decision in the
Muller case, the trend now is to look much more favorably upon
them.10 Abstractly, there is much to be said in favor of this legal
trend. Where two parties in an equal bargaining position agree that
any dispute shall be decided according to the law of a particular
jurisdiction and by a particular forum, there is no apparent reason
for not holding them to that bargain. It is somewhat disturbing,
however, that the breakthrough has occurred in admiralty, an area
in which enforcement of the agreement results, not merely in sending
the claimant to another state or another district, but in relegating him
to the tribunal of another country to seek his remedy and in which
equality of bargaining power is largely illusory."'
The Harter Act 2 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ' 3
which largely supersedes it 14 represent, in effect, legislative recogni-
tion of the lack of bargaining power in this area. Prompted by the
widespread use of bill of lading clauses which virtually absolved the
carrier of any responsibility for loss, 5 the purpose of the acts is to
define carrier liability.16  A degree of freedom of contract remains,
but only in the direction of increasing the liability of the carrier,
never of lessening it.17 Because of this bill of lading legislation, and
because of the continued existence of the unequal bargaining power
which prompted it, it is felt that the jurisdiction clause presents
problems peculiar to admiralty.' 8  The attempt here is to analyze
these problems.
The Extent of Enforcement
In Muller, the consignee of a shipment from Gothenburg,
Sweden, to Philadelphia filed libel in admiralty against the shipping
of goods); Field v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Iowa 185, 90 N.W. 717(1902) (stock certificates); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 182 N.C.
498, 109 S.E. 362 (1921) (automobile sales contract).
9 But see, Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903).
10 The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has been the only appellite
court to enforce such an agreement. There are some indications that its de-
termination is not looked upon with universal approval. See Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
granted, 359 U.S. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 999 (1959). But no
case to date has directly repudiated the Muller decision.ILIGSn uoR & BLACK, ADmIRALTY 165 (1957).
12 27 Stat. 445-46 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1952).
1349 Stat. 1207-13 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1952).
24 For a discussion of the extent to which the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act superseded the Harter Act, see Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 1078 (1941).
1-5See KNAUTH, OcErA BiLLs OF LADiNG 115-31 (4th ed. 1953) for a de-
tailed account of the commercial, judicial and legislative history behind the
statutes.
16 See GILMoPE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 122-27.
17 Id. at 125.
18 For a general discussion of the jurisdiction clause, see Note, 10 LA. L.
REv. 293 (1950).
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line to recover for loss of cargo. The bill of lading contained a clause
which stipulated that any claim should be decided according to the
law of Sweden and in Swedish courts. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in affirming the decision of the District Court,
held that, while the agreement itself cannot oust a court of jurisdic-
tion otherwise obtaining, it can be enforced when, in the discretion
of the court, it "is not unreasonable in the setting of the particular
case. ...." 19
The determination that a clause is not unreasonable is apparently
based on a judgment by the court that there is a relation between the
subject matter of the case and the jurisdiction named in the agree-
ment. The availability of evidence in the named jurisdiction appears
to be largely determinative of the relation. It is important to note,
however, that a determination that the clause is reasonable does not
necessarily involve a determination that the forum selected by the
plaintiff is not equally reasonable. Thus, in Muller, the plaintiff's
proof required the testimony of expert witnesses as to the value of
the lost cargo and these witnesses were available only in New York.
Yet the court, noting that the ship was of Swedish ownership and
construction and that the members of the crew resided in Sweden,
held the agreement not unreasonable. Similarly, in Aetna Insurance
Co. v. The Satrustegui,20 the claim involved damage to cargo in a
shipment from Spain to Puerto Rico, the damage allegedly being
caused by contact with water and other foreign substances. The
court, in enforcing an agreement granting exclusive jurisdiction to
the courts of Spain, noted that evidence of the condition of the goods
when shipped would be available only there; the fact that evidence
of its condition when received might well be available only in Puerto
Rico was not considered. It would appear, therefore, that a showing
by the plaintiff that the home forum is equally appropriate carries
little weight in determining the issue. If there are grounds for
granting jurisdiction to the forum named in the clause, the agreement
cannot be said to be unreasonable and the courts will enforce it.
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
Since it is not the agreement itself which ousts the court of
jurisdiction, but rather the court which, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, declines to exercise its jurisdiction in order to give effect to
the agreement, the question arises whether there is any real distinc-
tion between the "clause cases" and those applying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. The latter doctrine deals "with the discre-
tionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction
19 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806,
808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
20 171 F. Supp. 33 (D.P.R. 1959).
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whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropri-
ately tried elsewhere." 21 In truth, there is a close relation between
that doctrine and the theory on which jurisdiction clauses are en-
forced. It would be a mistake, however, to infer that because of the
forum non conveniens doctrine, the existence of the clause is un-
important. At least two distinctions can be noted when such a clause
is present:
Firstly, the courts seem never to have applied the forum non
conveniens doctrine where to do so would result in denying an
American citizen, suing in his own right, access to the federal courts, 22
although there is no decision expressly denying them the power to
do so. 2 3 The jurisdiction clause gives the effect of the doctrine, while
permitting the court to by-pass the question of whether, in the absence
of a contractual stipulation, it could deny access to the American
citizen.
2 4
Secondly, the conditions for application of the forum non con-
veniens doctrine seem much more demanding than those which will
justify the enforcement of a jurisdiction clause. The theory of forum
non conveniens is that the court can decline jurisdiction where ex-
ceptional circumstances make it inappropriate to exercise it.25 The
"clause cases," on the other hand, do not require a showing that the
home forum is inappropriate, but simply a showing that the foreign
tribunal is not unreasonable. Under the former doctrine, "a real
showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum
will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have
shown." 26 Under the "clause cases," the advantage of the plaintiff
seems only a minor factor; a showing by the defendant of a sub-
stantial relation between the jurisdiction named and the subject
21 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 COLUJm. L. REV. 1 (1929).
22The Suadades, 67 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See Braucher, The
Inconvendent Federal Forun, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 925 (1947).
23 The question was specifically left open in Swift & Co. Packers v. Com-
pania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 697 (1950); see The Supreme
Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARv. L. Rzv. 155-56 (1950). Some state courts, notably
those of New York, have categorically held that the courts have no power to
deny access to a resident. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235
N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923). There is also dictum to the effect that ajurisdiction agreement would not give the court that power. Schwartz v. Zim
Israel Nay. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 576, 577, 181 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (Sup. Ct.
1958). Because of this disparity of treatment of residents and non-residents,
it has been unsuccessfully argued that the doctrine might deny the latter "the
priveleges and immunities of Citizens in the several states." U.S. CoNsT.
art. IV, § 2. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
2465 HARV. L. REv. 184-85 (1951).
25 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947); Kloeckner
Reederei Und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754, 756
(2d Cir.), dismissed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 801 (1954).26 Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
524 (1947).
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matter of the case would make the clause reasonable and therefore
enforceable .27
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that "Every bill of
lading or similar document of title which is evidence of a contract for
the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States,
in foreign trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions of this
chapter." 28 The Act, an implementation of the Hague Rules on
international shipping,2 9 contains several provisions limiting the ex-
ceptions which the carrier can make to its common law liability. The
Act, unlike statutes of most other countries adopting the Rules, 30
provides that bills of lading in shipments to the United States, as
well as those from the United States, shall be subject to its pro-
visions.3 ' Manifestly, the purpose of this was to prevent the abuse
of the carrier's bargaining power, not only when the shipment orig-
inated here, but in any case where the shipment touched the United
States, and to prevent a carrier from availing himself of less stringent
regulations which might prevail in any other country which might
have an interest in the shipment, regardless of whether it be the
country of origin or of destination.32
The court in Muller held that, since the Act said nothing about
jurisdictional clauses explicitly, it did not invalidate them.3 3 But,
by declining jurisdiction, the court gave effect to a provision for
Swedish law and courts, thereby negating any effect which the Act
27 Conpare Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171 F. Supp. 33
(D.P.R. 1959), with Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
supra note 26.
2849 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1952). See also 49 Stat. 1212(1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
29 GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 123-24 (1957). The Hague Rules were
adopted by representatives of the shipping world and of the maritime nations,
first as a set of clauses intended for voluntary incorporation in bills of lading
by reference and then as a Convention to which the adherence of maritime
nations was invited. Id. at 123.
30 For a listing of the countries having Hague Rules legislation and a
conspectus of that legislation, see KNAUTH, OcEAN BILLS OF LADING 453-95(4th ed. 1953).3149 Stat. 1207, 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1312 (1952). Only the
United States, the Philippines, and Belgium have such a provision. KNAUTH,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 162. It is interesting to note that after the adoption
of this provision, Belgian courts held jurisdiction clauses to be invalid as
opposed to the new public policy, despite the general statement of the Belgian
Civil Code that parties have a wide freedom to agree what law shall govern
their contract, and what court shall be resorted to in the event of dispute.
Ibid.
32 The jurisdiction clause is treated as a method of evasion of the Act in
KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 30, at 161-62.
33 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806.
807 (2d Cir. 1955).
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might have had upon other provisions of the bill and, it would seem,
seriously weakening the force of the legislative declaration that every
bill of lading evidencing shipment to or from the United States is
subject to the provisions of the Act. 4 The Act makes no exception
based upon reasonableness or availability of evidence, nor is its ap-
plicability made subject to defeat by contractual agreement.
The inconsistency of enforcing a jurisdiction clause in the face
of such a legislative declaration becomes even more apparent in the
light of the later case of Sociedade Brasileira De Intercambio
Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este.3 5 In that case,
involving a shipment from New Orleans to Santos, Brazil, the court
refused to give effect to a stipulation for Uruguayan law and courts,
distinguishing the Muller case in that the bill of lading before it con-
tained a "clause paramount," 86 stating that the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act would be applicable. But it would seem that the dis-
tinction is more apparent than real. Surely Congress could not have
intended that the applicability of the statute was to be conditioned
on the parties' assent to it.37 Where a statute is designed to protect
against abuse of bargaining power, to imply that it becomes less
applicable because the parties fail to mention it in the contract would
be to completely negate its force.
In this respect, the case of Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v.
Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 38 cited by the court in Muller, differs ma-
terially. The shipment under consideration there was a shipment
from Peru to Belgium. Not being "to or from ports of the United
States," the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was not applicable. In
fact, the vessel being Norwegian-owned and operated, the contract
in no respect touched the United States, and the case is distinguish-
able from the ordinary forum non conveniens cases only in that the
plaintiff was an American citizen2
34 For a discussion of this point, see GILmoE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 125, n.23(1957).
35 135 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1955).
36 The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act requires that such a clause, reciting
that the bill is to be governed by the provisions of the Act, be inserted in all
outbound bills of lading. 49 Stat. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1952). The
reason for this is that the country of destination will apply its own law if the
Act is not mentioned. GIL.MoRE & BLACK, oP. cit. supra note 34, at 164-65. It
was understood that the Act would be read into the bill, regardless of the
absence of the clause, if the carrier were successfully subjected to suit in the
United States. Id. at 165.
3 This is obvious from a reading of the Act. It is provided that a carrier
shall be free to surrender any or all of his rights or immunities under the
Act, or to increase his responsibilities and liabilities as provided therein.
49 Stat. 1211 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1952). Any lessening of liability, on
the other hand, is null and void. 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (8)(1952).
38 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
39 In the district court, the case was decided on forum non conveniens
grounds. The plaintiff being treated as assignee of the Belgian buyer, the
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Jurisdiction Clause as Lessening of Liability
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, as already mentioned, was
designed to prevent the carrier from contracting away his liability.
Any lessening of liability otherwise than as provided by the Act is
declared to be null and void and of no effect. 40 The court in Muller
denied the contention that the increased expense incurred by the
plaintiff in litigating in Sweden would amount to a decrease in the
carrier's liability. 41 It is submitted, however, that while the expense
to the plaintiff in litigating in a foreign tribunal is not in itself a
lessening of the carrier's liability, it does provide him with a means
by which he can lessen his liability substantially. Suppose, for ex-
ample, a shipper has damages in the sum of one thousand dollars.
It can readily be seen that the expense of transporting expert wit-
nesses to the foreign jurisdiction, or even of taking depositions from
such witnesses for use in the litigation, might well preclude an action
on the claim, however valid. The aggregate liability of the carrier
is thus lessened by the total value of the claims so eliminated.4 2
Related to this would be the effect which the enforcement of the
jurisdiction clause would have in aiding the carrier to arrive at a
favorable settlement. At the point where the settlement offered equals
the probable judgment award less the expense of litigation, the
claimant, of course, would be well advised to accept the settlement
offer. Where the action must be brought in a foreign tribunal, this
settlement point is reached at a much lower figure than might other-
wise be possible, first, because the amount of damages awarded is
likely to be considerably less than American courts might render,43
and secondly, because the expense of the foreign litigation is certain
to be greater than the expense of prosecuting the same action in this
country.
As can readily be seen, the jurisdiction clause is a considerable
boon to the foreign carrier. It seems relevant to make some inquiry
case was regarded as one between foreigners. Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp.
v. Knut Knutsen O.A.S., 94 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4049 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1952).41 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806,
807 (2d Cir. 1955).42 A jurisdiction agreement made after accrual of the cause of action was
held to be an exemption from liability within the prohibition of section 5 of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §55(1952). Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (per curiam).
See also, Petersen v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P2d
744 (1946). It would seem that if a jurisdiction clause can be regarded as
an exemption from liability when it limits a cause of action to a particular
court in the United States, it should, with much greater reason, be considered
a lessening of liability when it limits jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal.4' Additionally, in cases where the value of the shipment is undeclared,
the value of the damage award is likely to be affected by fluctuating exchange
rates. See KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 283-88 (4th ed. 1953).
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into its possible effect on the American carrier. Incorporated in the
United States and with its principal place of business in this country,
it is unlikely that a court would consider a provision for foreign law
and foreign courts to be reasonable if made by such a carrier. He is
thus unaided by the possibility of enforcement of a jurisdiction clause,
but he is not unaffected by the judicial policy of holding such clauses
enforceable. The damages which he pays are the damages assessed
by American courts and he is unable to point to the expense of for-
eign litigation to induce a claimant to agree on a settlement. As a
result, his costs of settling claims are likely to be greater than those
of the foreign carrier with a similar loss record, which will possibly
be reflected in other costs, such as that of insurance. Moreover it
might necessitate an increase in prices, in government subsidies, 44 or
in both and further weaken his already poor competitive position in
the maritime world.45
Summary and Conclusion
Whatever may be said of holding a man to an agreement freely
made, that argument is of little force in regard to provisions of ad-
miralty bills of lading. Equality of bargaining power in this area is
a fiction as evidenced by the fact that bills of lading are drawn up
by the carriers. The entire legislative history of the area bespeaks
the necessity of protecting the shipper from an abuse by the carrier
of its bargaining position. In the light of this inequality, there is
little justification for refusing an American the protection of United
States laws and of denying him access to United States courts.40
On the other hand, there are several reasons for refusing to en-
force the jurisdiction clause. When a bill of lading evidences a con-
tract for the carriage of goods to or from ports of the United States,
to permit it to be interpreted according to foreign law is a negation
of congressional efforts to protect the cargo owner.47 If it be ad-
witted that the United States statutes are applicable, it would seem
44 For a summary of the extent of Federal subsidization of shipping, see
Morse, A Review of the Assistance provided to the American Merchant Marine
Under Statutes of the United States and their Administration by the Federal
Maritime Board and the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 18 FED. B.J. 355 (1958).
45 For a review of the difficulties already facing the American Merchant
Marine, see Magnuson, Maritime Legislative Problems Facing the 86th
Congress, 18 FED. B.J. 350 (1958).
41 What was said in regard to a jurisdiction agreement between a railroad
and an employee seems equally applicable here: "(1) they are contracts of a
kind at which courts have always looked askance; (2) they concern a matter
as to which-in some respects at any rate-Congress has shown that it con-
sidered the employee to bargain at a disadvantage; (3) that disadvantage is
in this instance especially marked and is without any corresponding benefit."
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (concurring
opinion).
47 While as a general rule, a stipulation of the parties as to the law gov-
erning a contract will be followed by the courts, apparently this has never
been the case with shipping contracts. Note, 62 -ARv. L. REv. 647, 654 (1949).
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seldom to be reasonable to consider a foreign court as a more appro-
priate court to apply it.4 s  In addition, while not expressly denying
the liability imposed by statute, the jurisdiction clause, if enforced,
may have the same effect as a denial, by preventing actions on claims
arising out of the liability.49
In view of these considerations, it is submitted that the enforce-
ment of such clauses is, under normal circumstances, an unwise ex-
ercise of judicial discretion. The solution to the problem presented
by the current trend towards enforcing them, would appear to lie
either in legislative action in the form of an amendment to the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which would expressly invalidate
them, 50 or in review by the Supreme Court, when presented with
the proper opportunity, of the extent of the discretionary power of
the courts to decline jurisdiction in such cases 51 In the meantime,
the protection of the American cargo owner must depend upon the
cautious application by the courts of their newly declared discre-
tionary power. It is suggested that before a court permit application
of foreign law, a minimum requirement should be that the country
named adhere to the Hague Rules on international shipping. To
require less would be to invite a return of the abuses which prevailed
prior to the formulation of the Rules, and which still prevails in
countries which recognize no limitations on the carrier's power to
contract away his liability.
48 A principal element affecting the application of the forum non conveniens
doctrine is that to reach a decision the court must determine difficult questions
under the law of another jurisdiction. Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HAav. L. Rav. 908, 924 (1947).
49 It might be said that the size of the claim is one factor which should
be considered by the court in exercising its jurisdiction, since it is the small
claim which is most likely to be excluded by the jurisdiction clause. The fact,
however, that a court in its discretion might elect to hear his complaint would
offer very little solace to the claimant who must engage an attorney and pre-
pare to prosecute the action with the uncertainty that the court will exercisejurisdiction. Should he elect to sue and the court declines jurisdiction, he
has then suffered not only the loss resulting from the carrier's negligence,
but also the expense of futilely attempting to collect damages for that loss.
5oThe Carriage of Goods Act of Australia currently contains such a pro-
vision. A similar provision was also contained in the Canadian Act of 1910,
but it was not carried over in subsequent legislation. It is still felt, however,
that Canadian courts will not look with favor upon clauses ousting theirjurisdiction. KNAUTHr, OcEAx Biu.s OF LADING 238 (4th ed. 1953).51The question was almost passed on in March, 1959. The Fifth Circuit
refused to extend the Muller decision to an it rem proceeding where the juris-
diction clause, by its terms, did not apply to such a proceeding. Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958). The Supreme
Court at first granted certiorari. The S.S. Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export,
Inc., 358 U.S. 809 (1958). The writ, however, was dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, the majority holding: "We do not believe that this case
affords us an appropriate instance to pass upon the extent to which effect can
be given to such stipulations in ocean bills of lading not to resort to the
courts of this country." The S.S. Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.,
359 U.S. 180, 182 (1959) (four judges dissenting).
[ VOL. 34
